



Hilfen für die junge Generation

Assistance for the Younger Generation

Statistik und Planung in der Großstadt

Statistics and Planning in Big Agglomerations

Edition 2003

Erziehung und kulturelles Erbe

Education and cultural heritage

herausgegeben von
edited by

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IFAD Berlin**

**Ergebnisse der V. Internationalen Fachtagung "Statistik und Jugendhilfeplanung in der Großstadt",
21. – 23. Januar 2002 im "Haus am Rupenhorn" in Berlin**

Results of the IV. International Conference "Statistics and Planning the Help for the Younger Generation in
Big Agglomerations", 21 – 23 January 2002 at "Haus am Rupenhorn" in Berlin



Impressum

Ein Gemeinschaftsprodukt von drei Berliner Institutionen

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Die Verantwortung für den Inhalt der Beiträge dieser Veröffentlichung obliegt der jeweiligen Autorin bzw. dem jeweiligen Autor.

Redaktionsschluss:

31. Dezember 2002

Fertigstellung des Manuskripts:

Januar 2003

Drucklegung des Bandes:

Januar 2003 im IFAD Berlin

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*Ze zeggen dat geluk niet zo te koop is,
Maar geld doet wonderen, en vooral als het een hoop is
(They say that happiness is not for sale,
but money achieves miracles, particularly in heaps)
Wim Sonneveld, Dutch comedian*

Measuring Happiness across cultures and education levels

Rupenhorn meeting 2002, Focus 2002: Education and Cultural Heritage, Berlin

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1. Introduction

The subject of happiness has for a long time been the subject of speculation. By lack of valid measures of happiness, propositions about this subject could not be measured with any claim to objectivity. Hence, understanding of happiness remained speculative and uncertain. During the last three decades or so, new surveying methods introduced by sociologists, psychologists and medical researchers have developed fairly dependable measures of happiness, and through these measures, a significant body of knowledge has been obtained. Most of these studies are part of a broader field of inquiry, commonly referred to as Quality of Life (QoL).

Research on QoL tries to define what a good life is, and how well reality meets these standards. This research tradition is rooted in the 18th century concept of Enlightenment. In this perspective, the purpose of human life is life itself, rather than service and obedience to a worldly King or a religious God. Self-actualisation and happiness thus become central values. Society in this view is seen as an organisational form destined to provide its citizens with a good life. During the nineteenth century, that conviction expressed itself in the humanitarian creed that the best society is the one that provides "the greatest happiness for the largest number of people".

In the 20th century, this view inspired large scale attempts to planned social reform, and influenced the development of welfare states.

Initially, society's most blatant evils were being attacked: ignorance, illness and poverty. Thus progress was measured in terms of literacy, control of diseases through hygiene, life style and advances in medical knowledge, and through the elimination of hunger. As most western nations developed into affluent societies during the 19th and 20th century, limits to economic growth were recognised, and post-modernistic values came to the fore.

As a result, the QoL concept was introduced, which combined two aspects:

- 1) the presence of conditions deemed necessary for a good life; and
- 2) the practice of good living as such.

At the individual level, this term is applied in both meanings. These conditions may coincide, but they do not concur by necessity. A person can be rich, powerful and popular, but may still be troubled or ailing and unhappy. Conversely, a person who is poor and isolated may nevertheless thrive physically and mentally. Thus, popular belief in the rich countries has it, that poor Africans live so carefree and without pressing daily commitments that they are a lot happier than their wealthy rat-race western counterparts. This is a shortsighted view, which makes no distinction between presumed and apparent happiness.

Happiness is one of the indicators of apparent QoL. Together with indicators of physical and mental health, it shows how well people thrive.

Crucial to the measurement technique is, that a definition of happiness is not provided to the subjects who are to report on their state of happiness. We will return to a definition of happiness and its measurement.

One important finding across cultures and time of these measurements:

In all modern, developed nations, single persons take less pleasure in life than married persons or people living together do. This difference in happiness between singles and couples is usually greater than between being rich and being poor. These differences are typically interpreted as

being the result of deprivation. Singles seem to lack something. A problem in using this concept of self-reported happiness is that it indicates that something is wrong in terms of happiness with singles, but it does not say what. The discontent of the unmarried could be due to their having a negative reputation, but it could also be attributed to their loneliness or lack of social support. Another problem is that the observed difference may be due to selection: unhappy people may be less inclined to marry, or may be less attractive as a marriage partner.

2. Definitions

Happiness is a state of mind. In everyday language it may refer to the feelings of this or that particular moment, as well as to a stable and positive appreciation of life over a longer period of time. We will concentrate on the second meaning.

Ruut Veenhoven, sociologist at the University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, from whom I derive most of the data of this presentation, has compiled a database with data from over 2000 studies on happiness. He defines happiness as follows:

Happiness is the degree to which a person evaluates the overall quality of his life as a whole positively. In other words, happiness is defined as how much the person likes the life he or she leads.

Some synonyms often used for happiness are life-satisfaction, or subjective well-being, which emphasize the subjective nature of happiness.

Evaluations through self-assessment may vary in their degree of uncertainty. Some people are steady and outspoken about their appraisal of life, other people vacillate.

Some reach their conclusions about happiness through elaborate contemplation. Others make an immediate, intuitive judgment. Many appraisals are not always appropriate, and may even be a result of distorted judgments. If people are not happy, but they very much want to be, or they think the experimenter questioning them expects them to be happy, they may report to be happy when in fact they are not.

3. Measuring happiness

In measuring happiness, no steady, reliable, physiological correlates like for instance blood pressure can be found. Neither are there specific types of behaviour that can be linked with certainty to happiness. Although some social behaviours like being active, outgoing and friendly are often associated with happiness, such conduct can also be observed among unhappy people. Estimates of someone's unhappiness by peers are often wrong. Suicidal behaviour seems to be the best correlate to unhappiness, though not all unhappy people resort to suicide. Interestingly, statistics on suicide tell us that the highest number of suicides over a time scale of about 200 years are found in Hungary, followed by Austria and Switzerland, countries which do not seem to share more than their central location in Europe.

Since inference from overt behaviours is impossible, we have to resort to questioning. Such questions can be posed in various contexts, such as clinical interviews, life-review questionnaires, and ordinary surveys. Questions can be repeated in different wordings, directly or indirectly, by means of single or multiple question items. The validity and reliability of such simple self reports has been questioned repeatedly.

3.1 Validity doubts

People may report what is expected from them, rather than what they feel or believe. Yet, answers seem to come promptly, and most people know quite well whether they enjoy life or not. For instance, in the Netherlands good education is commonly regarded as a prerequisite for a good, happy life. Yet, the highly educated appear slightly less happy in comparison to their less educated counterparts.

3.2 Reliability doubts

Single questions on happiness seem to measure what they are supposed to measure, but rather imprecisely. Identical questions do not always for the same subject lead to identical responses. Correlations are about $+0.7$. Over a period of a week, test-retest reliability drops to about $+0.6$.

Subtle differences in the precise wording of questions may tip the scale from one response to a different one. So in terms of reliability, these measurements have their limitations.

4. Comparability of happiness across nations

As we can see in viewgraph 1 ab, Russia scored 4.51 on a ten point scale for average life satisfaction, whereas Switzerland scored 8.21. Does this mean that the Russians really take less pleasure in life than the Swiss do?

One reason to challenge this conclusion is that language is a distorting factor. If happiness means something different in Russian than in German, French or Italian, this might be the case. But the fact that all Swiss people respond in a similar manner, regardless their different language, is a counterargument to this objection. Data from other bi- or tri-lingual countries confirm that language does not play a role in the measurement of happiness.

graph 1: **Happiness in 48 nations early 1990's**

<i>Nation</i>		<i>Average appreciation of life</i>		
<i>Code</i>	<i>name</i>	<i>Happiness</i>	<i>Life-satisfaction</i>	<i>Affect Balance</i>
RA	Argentina*	6,90	6,95	6,26
AUS	Australia	7,67	7,90	7,04
A	Austria	7,33	6,13	6,77
WY	Belarus (White Russia)	4,87	5,02	5,77
B	Belgium	7,70	7,39	6,57
BR	Brazil	6,47	7,10	6,18
GB	Britain	7,60	7,19	6,71
BG	Bulgaria	4,43	4,48	-
CND	Canada	6,83	7,65	7,31
RCH	Chile*	6,78	7,28	6,03
CN	China*	6,40	6,72	6,28
CZ	Czecho-Slovakia (former)	5,57	5,89	5,67
DK	Denmark	7,87	7,96	6,93
EW	Estonia	5,27	5,55	5,77
SF	Finland	6,97	7,42	6,18
F	France	7,20	6,43	6,33
D	Germany (former West-)	6,80	6,91	6,47
DDR	Germany (former East-)	6,53	6,35	5,94
G	Greece	5,90	5,60	-
H	Hungary	5,73	5,59	5,86
IS	Iceland	7,93	7,79	7,53
IND	India*	6,03	5,80	5,33
IRL	Ireland	7,87	7,64	7,03
IL	Israel	6,27	-	-
I	Italy	6,60	6,69	6,24
J	Japan	6,66	6,13	5,26
LR	Latvia	5,08	5,23	5,92
LT	Lithuania	4,97	5,57	5,60
L	Luxembourg	7,27	7,60	-
MEX	Mexico	6,50	7,12	6,58
NI	Northern Ireland	7,63	7,65	6,72
NZ	New Zealand	7,22	-	-
NL	Netherlands	7,97	7,60	6,87
WAN	Nigeria	6,43	6,02	6,54
N	Norway	7,43	7,43	7,31
RP	Philippines	6,93	-	-
PL	Poland	6,57	6,27	6,46
P	Portugal	6,10	6,76	6,36
RO	Romania	5,43	5,42	5,71
SU	Russia	5,10	4,51	5,33
ZA	South Africa	6,07	6,01	6,21
ROK	South Korea	6,20	6,32	-
SLO	Slovenia	5,40	5,88	6,53
SP	Spain	6,80	6,82	5,73
S	Sweden	7,87	7,75	7,90
CH	Switzerland	7,67	8,21	-
TR	Turkey*	6,93	6,01	5,60
US	United States of America	7,60	7,46	7,23

Data from World Database of Happiness (update 1996), tables 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b. Most of the data from World Value Study 2. Scores transformed to scale 0-10

* Probably too high. Score based on samples in which poor rural population was under-represented

A second objection is desirability bias. In countries where the pursuit of happiness, which is even a part of the American Constitution, ranks high as a life value, people might be more inclined to overstate their enjoyment of life. Veenhoven found no support for this claim.

Is happiness perhaps part and parcel of the national character, if there is such a thing? In this view, some national cultures would tend to have a gloomy outlook on life, (cf. Murphy's First Law: everything that can go wrong will go wrong), whereas other cultures are more optimistic.

France would typically be an instance of gloominess, the USA of optimism. If this were true, no policy could ever bring more happiness to gloomy nations, because it is not the living conditions, but the gloomy national disposition which is decisive. Time series on the individual as well as on the national level prove this view to be wrong. Individuals revise their evaluation of life periodically. Nations may move up or down on the ladder of average happiness, and it is usually not difficult to see to what factors this may be attributed.

Veenhoven also analysed happiness of migrants, to obtain a better view on cultural differences in terms of happiness. He compared the appreciation of life of migrants with both the average happiness in country of settlement and with happiness in the country of origin. If happiness reflects the quality of conditions one lives in, the happiness of migrants in a country must be close to the level of the people who lived in the country of settlement all their lives.

If, however, happiness is a character trait or a national cultural trait, then the happiness of migrants must continue to resemble that of their country of origin. Veenhoven analysed two specific countries, viz. Australia and its migrants from Britain. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Yugo-Slavia, and Germany and its migrants from Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugo-Slavia. He found in both cases for all migrant groups no support for inborn happiness or the lack of it.

5. Correlates of average happiness in nations

Having dealt with some objections against the measurement of happiness, let us now turn to the important question which external factors may or may not show an influence on the results of these measurements.

For simplicity's sake, I will restrict myself to correlates of happiness pooled over 48 nations based on data from 1990, either or not controlled for affluence. A direct relationship between happiness and income has been established between income and happiness up to about \$ 10,000 per year, after which the relationship disappears. Let us have a look at viewgraph 2 ab.

graph 2:

Correlates of average happiness in nations 48 nations 1990			
nation characteristics	correlation with happiness		N
	zero order	affluence controlled	
Material affluence			
Income per head: purchasing power 1989	+.64**	---	43
Incidence of absolute poverty:			
* malnutrition: % < 2500 calories	— .16	+ .12	42
* % without safe water	— .35	+ .24	38
Security			
Physical safety			
* murder rate	— .39**	— .17	39
* lethal accidents	— .67**	— .49**	39
Legal security: incidence of corruption	— .73**	— .50*	37
Social security: state expenditures in % GDP	+ .38	— .03	34
Freedom			
Political freedom			
* respect of political rights	+ .35*	+ .34	47
* respect of civil rights	+ .41*	+ .34	47
Personal freedom			
* freedom of marriage: acceptance divorce	+ .18	+ .02	42
* freedom of procreation:			
* abortion available	+ .13	— .12	37
* sterilization available	+ .18	+ .27	34
* freedom of sexuality :			
* acceptance of homosexuality	+ .62**	+ .20	42
* acceptance of prostitution	+ .35	— .10	42
* freedom to dispose of own life :			
* acceptance suicide	+ .29	+ .03	42
* acceptance of euthanasia	+ .28	— .01	40
Self-perceived freedom :			
* in life	+ .50**	+ .24	42
* at work	+ .74**	+ .47*	41
Social equality			
Income-inequality: ratio lowest to highest 20%	— .11	+ .07	28
Gender-equality: woman empowerment index	+ .51**	+ .07	35
Class-inequality: educational homogamy	— .52*	— .58*	27
Cultural climate			
Education			
* % literate	+ .19	— .11	47
* school enrolment ratio	+ .51**	+ .26	36
* average years in school	— .07	— .06	40
Information			
* newspapers pc	+ .36*	— .07	32
* TV receivers pc	+ .39**	— .23	42
Religion			
* belief in God	+ .38*	+ .40*	37
* religious identification	+ .24	+ .20	41
* religious participation	+ .15	+ .28	38
Value orientation: Hofstede dimensions			
* individualism	+ .69**	+ .04	32
* power distance	— .50**	— .05	32

Next to a positive relation between affluence and happiness for the poor countries, happiness relates moderately with security, moderately with various aspects of freedom, strongly with equality, and strongly negative with inequality.

Access to information correlates strongly with happiness for low income countries, fairly positively with religious beliefs and participation, with the absence of prejudice, and very strongly with social participation, particularly for low income countries. Predictably, military dominance does not create happiness. Population pressure does not correlate with unhappiness, on the contrary, urbanisation, next to industrialisation and informatisation seem to contribute to happiness.

Returning to the title of my presentation, I have made some remarks about happiness and culture, but not much so far about education. As we can see in viewgraph 2, there is no clear relation with literacy, which may come as a surprise, but a very pronounced one with school enrollment as such, particularly in poor countries, but not with the number of years of education, which may again be surprising.

Summarising, it seems that happiness is to a fair extent measurable across individuals and nations, and may help policy makers to achieve greater happiness to a larger number of people, supposing that such a result what the policy maker aims at.

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See also www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness

Culture as determinant in the Young/Old relation: The case of Hungary

Education and cultural heritage, Rupenhorn 21-23 January 2002
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Foreword

Generally speaking, Hungarian citizens understand themselves as Europeans. At the same time, the particular traditions of the Hungarians modify their social habits so that they are different from other Central European cultures.

In my paper I will feature several aspects regarding the relationship between the elderly and other generations as have been experienced in recent years in Hungarian society. Focusing on intergenerational bonds, especially within families, I will first of all examine the activities of the coming-of-age population, i.e. citizens who have turned 55, then I will look at their contribution to the household and family care. I would like to point out that when older people engage in an active way of life, they are able to maintain an optimal level of well-being, extend their healthy life expectancy, and improve their quality of life in older age. According to my working hypothesis, by making use of the capabilities and creativity of seniors, the social requirements for old-age care will be lessened.

Demographic development in Hungary

Ageing of the citizen is an issue affecting not only the world's developed nations, but also the countries with economies in transition. Thus, the ratio of the population more than 60 years of age to the total population is also continuously increasing in Hungary. In 1870, this ratio was five percent, in 1930, ten percent, and in 1970, one-sixth of the total population belonged to the age group over 60. Today, every fifth Hungarian citizen has turned 60, meaning that the total elderly population is nearly two million. With the exception of Austria, the ratio of the elderly person to the total population is lower in Hungary's neighbouring countries than in Hungary. According to estimates regarding Hungarian demographics, the number of people in Hungary will drop approximately twenty percent by 2050, and half of that population will be more than 50 years old.

The distribution of elderly people by regions and types of settlement is quite uneven. The share of the elderly population is higher in the capital Budapest (21.6 percent) and in the smaller settlements (20.5 percent) than the national average (19.4 percent). Of the elderly population, only two-fifths are male. The ratio of women to men increases in terms of age: in the 60-64 age group this indicator is 1295, and in the age group more than 85 years the indicator rises to 2372.

Economic activity of the elderly people in Hungary today¹

The Hungarian Time Use Survey, which was published by the Statistical Office of the Hungarian Republic, has provided data on the way of life of the retired; this survey provides researchers with information on occupations, living modes, and how people spend their time. The 1999-2000 survey is closely connected with a statistical survey focussing on individual and household time use in the EU.

The substantial changes in the Hungarian employment market after 1990, changes which fundamentally determine the shaping of the number and living modes of the retired, are also reflected in the data of the time-use survey. One of the most important alterations is that the entire time requirement of the population between 15 and 74 years of age for gainful employment was in 1999 only 79 percent of what the average had been in 1986 (see Table 1).

Table 1:

Time spent on gainful work in Hungary, 1986-1999			
Time spent on gainful work by the population aged 15-74 Per month, in Millions of Hours			
Economic activity	1986	1999	1999 1986 = 100 percent
Gainful work of employed	909	727	80
Of which:			
in main job	704	636	90
income-supplementing work	205	91	44
Gainful work of unemployed	-	24	-
Gainful work of inactive persons	227	144	63
Total	1.136	895	79

Source: Time use, 1986 and 1999 autumn, Hungarian Central Statistical Office

¹ The UNO proclaimed the year 1999 as the International Year of Elderly People. On this occasion the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs of Hungary and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office initiated a research project in 1999 for the exploration of the situation of elderly people. This project is based mainly on the results of the 1996 Micro Census and the 1998 Household Survey. The latest Hungarian survey of individual and household time use was published in 2000. In order to follow significant tendencies and relations, the results of both investigations were used in this paper.

The time spent on gainful work has seen a reduction of more than 20 percent, and this is above all a consequence of the changes experienced in the labour market, not influences from technological progress. The largest decline occurred in the area of production work. The gainful employment of retired people declined more than a third while their numbers rapidly increased. (From 1990 to 1999 the number of the retired went up from 2,520 to 3,141.)

The increase of unemployment, which started in the eighties and significantly accelerated in the nineties after the change of political system, specifically affected the elderly age groups. In 1996 the ratio of employed people, including active earners and part-time retired people, was 4 percent (32 thousand) for males who were 60 years of age and higher, and only 3 percent (46 thousand) for females 55 and above. The number of employees in the age group five years below pension age was very low, particularly in comparison with the same ratios in 1980 and 1990. For people above or near the pension age, it is very difficult to keep a job, and it is even more difficult to find other employment after the loss of a job. Due to the extremely low occurrence of employment in the age groups above 70 and 80 years, no specific figures could be provided.

As far as the regions are concerned, the labour market chances of the elderly female and male population are best for those living in the central region of Hungary, including the metropolitan district of Budapest.

All things considered, elderly people have shared in the considerable fall of the living standard which befell the entire Hungarian population. Up to 1990, the income of the elderly generations increased due to pension-automatism, whereby the benefits of new pensioners exceeded that of deceased ones. The pension to wage ratio was at its highest in 1990 when average pension benefits amounted to 66 percent of the average net wages. In 1999 the same ratio was less than 60 percent. Consequently, the buying power of pensions was reduced to a larger extent than that of wages in the nineties. Also, the contribution of other income components supplementing the pension—such as income from employment, social allowances, or other income—was negligible.

Some elderly people need assistance because of health problems or other circumstances, and some others may be providing support to their children or grandchildren via physical work and/or financial contributions. At a time when the time spent by the population on gainful work is decreasing, the household is continually receiving a more and more important role: this sector uses an ever-increasing portion of the society's time expenditure.

The quantity of the society's time spent on household and family care did not change significantly in the examined period, but the time expenditure of certain classes of society with regard to these activities is very different. Carrying out the investigation of the economic activity of the population, it can be established that the time spent on households of the retired has grown the most (see Table 2).

Table 1:

Time spent on household and family care in Hungary, 1986-1999			
Time spent on household and family care by the population aged 15-74 Per month			
Economic activity	1986 in Millions of Hours	1999 in Millions of Hours	1999 1986 = 100 percent
Employed	387	284	73
Unemployed	-	48	-
Pensioners	155	234	151
Employees on maternity leave	53	62	117
Housewives, students	98	52	53
Total	693	680	98

Source: Time use, 1986 and 1999 autumn, Hungarian Central Statistical Office

According to the statistical data, it seems that retired people have taken upon themselves a part of the work load concerning the household and family care of the employed citizen. In 1999 the retired performed 34 percent of all household tasks involving the raising of children. The explanation for this is obvious: The pensioners, after they are thrust out of the working market, attempt to be useful in the household. The retired Hungarians are remaining active even in retirement, and they strive to take care of the following generation.

The figures clearly show that family relations are decisive in the lives of Hungarian elderly people. This can be explained by Hungary's cultural background and mentality. Thus, the large amount of time spent by seniors on household and family care is not only the consequence of unfavourable changes in the labour market but also a result of the cultural and social background.

The Hungarian society is centred around children; it is taken for granted that parents will care for their children. During their whole lives parents feel that they are responsible for supporting their children, even after their children have their own children. Typical of the connection between elderly and other generations in Hungary is the obligation Hungarians feel to help the younger on the one hand and the manner in which children naturally accept the parents' help on the other hand.

Conclusions

The function of the elderly is decreasing in the Hungarian society. In the period of transition, i.e. in the period of fundamental changes in the social and the economic system of Hungary, the society relies above all on the young age-groups, on those who can make themselves masters of the new knowledge. The older generations either have been pensioned off or are confronted with the new requirements of the challenges on the labour market. This occurrence can be managed specifically as a transformation problem. In the years of the transition, the experiences and knowledge of the middle-aged and old employees only conditionally suited the requirements brought about by the changed circumstances. But the human capital of the generation which is just now growing old will not become obsolete so rapidly, for they have adapted themselves to the new environment, and they too will most probably be interested in active ageing. From this perspective it is clear that Hungary is continuously catching up with Western Europe.

Having analysed the possibilities and limits which Hungarian pensioners are faced with as well as the perspectives of active ageing, we may conclude that in spite of the relatively narrow and in many respects worsening possibilities concerning the satisfaction of the bare necessities of life, the present elderly generation in Hungary endeavours to spend its time usefully, above all in the household and child care; thus, they strengthen intergenerational bonds within families.

Children and Career

A demographic, sociological and economic challenge in France and Germany

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
Abstract.

Since the early 70ies, the fertility in France and in Germany is steadily decreasing. As a result, the ongoing ageing of the population is increasingly destabilising the welfare system. Known factors with negative influence on fertility are female activity and birth control. The French province Guadeloupe is a recent illustration for the impact of these factors on the fertility. In France and in Germany, harmonise female paid activity and motherhood is a demographic, sociological and economic challenge to be mastered in order to rebalance their welfare system. In this paper we highlight two further factors with positive influence on fertility: prestige of motherhood and expected quality of life of children to be born. Both factors are not currently utilized by French and German family policy.

1. Introduction

Post-industrial countries like France and Germany run a welfare system based on direct transfer of income from the working population to the non-working population. The current crisis of the welfare system, particularly the high and growing efforts required to support the retired population, is caused by the ageing of population and a high unemployment rate. First, the ageing of population is caused by a low total fertility that is steadily decreasing since 30 years. The total fertility was 2.67 in 1967 in France, 5.33 in Guadeloupe, French province since 1946; 1.75 in 2001 in France, 1.33 in Germany (see [2]) and 2.0 in 1995 in Guadeloupe (see [11]). All those total fertility indicators are under the level of replacement of population of 2.1 children per woman. Despite of family policy traditionally based on financial benefits and public childcare facilities, the total fertility is steadily decreasing. Traditional family policy seems to be inefficient.

Figure 1. Network of positive and negative Influences



In Germany, Hank and Kreyenfeld (see [7]) made some empirical analysis about the effect on childcare availability on the fertility. They found out that there is no statistically significant effect of childcare availability on fertility. In France, the sum of the family allowance at the third child is similar to the wage of a unskilled worker, about 1000 EURO¹ (see [5]). Despite of this fact, the two-child family is the French standard (see [10]). A high unemployment contributes to destabilise the welfare system in France and in Germany. One of the effects of the feminism movement in France and in Germany has been the increase of the number of working women. In Germany, the female activity rate is 48.4% and in France, it is 48.6%. In Guadeloupe, the female activity rate is 55.3% (see [3,8]). The higher female activity rate in Guadeloupe is linked to the traditional work of the women in this overseas province of France. At the time of the colonisation between 1674 and 1946, the women were expected to work like the men on the plantations. There was no need for women over there to fight for their rights to access the labour market. However, after the integration to France in 1946, they also fight to have equality of chance on the labour market after the integration in France in 1946 like in Germany. The female unemployment rate is 37.9% in this former French colony, according to the last population census in 1999, in France, it is 13.5% in 2001 and 10.4% in Germany (see [3,8]). Birth control enabled by contraception and economic independence enable by paid work are described as the two main factors driving the decrease of the fertility (see [6]).


¹ Only for one-wage family. Most of the time the woman doesn't work and stay at home.

Anyway, one challenge to be mastered in order to balance the French and German welfare system is to harmonise work and motherhood, thereby the fertility of women in those countries. In this paper we will focus on two other factors which may have an effect on the fertility of the women but are not addressed by traditional family policy. The first one is the expected quality of life of the children to be born and the second one is the social prestige of motherhood. The above influences on fertility are summarised in Fig 1. using a so-called influence diagram. An influence diagram is a graph whose labelled nodes represent relevant parameters, e.g. rates, and whose directed edges represent negative or positive influences on those parameters. Influence diagrams are a useful tool for analysing and communicating the behaviour of dynamical systems.

2. Expected quality of life

If the actual expected quality of life of a child to be born is high, most women will take the decision to have a child and the fertility will increase. At the time of the slavery in the French colony Guadeloupe this expected quality of life was very low, so that the natural growth of the slave population was close to zero, although since 1780 the slave owners tried to promote fertility among the slave female. But slave female preferred to abort or to kill the new born to protect the child of a hard life as slave. They risked hard and inhuman punishments if they were discovered. Hence the living conditions under the slavery had been very hard without any individual liberty. The fertility could not be increased by family policy (see[4]). Nowadays the unemployment among young people independent of their level of education (see[1]) has the same effect on the fertility or the decision to have a child in Guadeloupe. There are some other factors, e.g. the modernisation and a few opportunities in the local labour market, which may appear more important to explain the recent fertility situation in Guadeloupe but in this paper we want to focus on factors that are hard to measure. Among the 25-29 years old, the unemployment rate is 46,4% in Guadeloupe, in contrast the unemployment rate in EU-15 is about 15%. In France, Guadeloupe and Germany about 90 % of the 16-18 years participate at the school system (see[3,8]). Regarding to the high unemployment rate among the young people the expected quality of life of the child to be born is also bad and will not promote motherhood, although the level of education among the young is nowadays high.

Figure 2. Influences on expected quality of life



More than the unemployment of the young people the expected compatibility of motherhood and paid work will act positive on the fertility in France and Germany. In Fact, e.g. in Germany, this compatibility is low. On the one hand, women would like to take care for the children by themselves if they had some. On the other hand, they also want to exercise a paid activity considering that, thanks feminism fights for economic independent women, they are high qualified and may be willing to make career. But we observed that most of the time German women are forced by politic decisions and traditional beliefs to choose between the motherhood or their career (see[7]). In Germany it seems to give no middle way to manage this interest conflict. If German women had a high expected compatibility between children and career, they would have more children. Only 3.2% of women with 3 or more children (younger than 3 years old) are still working in France, 1.9% in Germany (see[3]).


3. Prestige of motherhood

Nowadays, the social prestige of motherhood in the French and German societies contribute to the fall of the fertility too. First, only if women accepted the motherhood and the traditional distribution of work between men and women, they would prefer not to exercise any activity and concentrate on having children. The education is considered like a cultural benefit, about 20% (10% to 30%) of the female population. These women would likely consider the advantage of the family policy. Besides, a majority of women will attempt to have both a paid activity and a family.

They may work but without making career. In that case education is necessary to access a paid-work, about 60% (40% to 80%) of all women, but not necessary to support any career purposes. Those women could be influenced by social and employment policy and could pay more attention on the equality of chance between men and women. The last group of female is as large as the first one. This is the group of the career women.

In that category women would hardly have a child and run a family. They would prefer to have a strategy to promote their career using their education and taking care of it to reach this aim. So their fertility choice could not be influenced through any social and family policy at all (see[6]). The current family policies support only the first female group. Because of the feminism in France and in Germany the image of the non working women is worse than before and that may be one of the reason why the fertility is still decreasing. Even some women are trying to introduce mother like a desirable status opposite the career or working woman, however, they have to face the incomprehension of the society. To have had a successful career as a model is not enough to be respected only as household mother. Ines de la Fresganges reported in Marie Claire 2002 about her unpleasant experiences of not being accepted only as a mother of two children taking care of her household (see[9]). Furthermore, in Germany, the image of the working woman with children is not accepted or the situation of a working woman with a very young child is particularly difficult. This is e.g. reflected by the current German chancellor, who recently said “the child belongs to its mother” (see[10]). He may be right but exclude by the way the necessity of working for alone mother, for example.

Figure 3. Influences on prestige of motherhood




4. Discussion

This paper is based on the analysis of demographic literature of the last 20 years about this subject. The direct transfer of income from the working population to the non working population is increasingly hampered by the ageing of the population. This is widely recognised as an important socio-economic issue. One possibility to solve this problem is discussed in this paper: Control the fertility using traditional instruments like financial supports to family and childcare availability, or improve by education, particularly among the young generations, the low social prestige of motherhood and increase the compatibility between children and career. A second possibility is to make the welfare system, particularly the payment of the retired people, independent from the population evolution. Then the ageing of the population and the decrease of the fertility will not threaten the welfare system any more. In Holland, the model of the welfare system is different of the one in France and in Germany, so that the ageing of the population over there does not influence the payment of the retired people. There could be a third way to solve the issue of the crisis of the welfare system. An increase of the age of retirement would be an option to adapt the welfare system to the ageing of the population. Jacques Chirac, the current president of the French Republic, has recently made the proposition to increase this age. 70 years will be the new retirement age in France if he is elected a second time in 2002 for the French presidency. Today the legally age to be retired is around 65 years old, but it is possible to be retired before, starting of the age of 55. A fourth way could be to introduce in women biography a five-year-long motherhood period supported not only by the government, but also by the companies and least but not last tolerated by the all society.

5. Conclusion

The situation of most women, according to the C. Hakim theory of preferences, is to manage to increase the compatibility between children and if not career a paid work. This situation may be a challenge to be mastered from the welfare system in France and in Germany too, as long as their welfare system is based on the transfer of income from the working population to the non working population. It is important too to improve the expected quality of life of children to be born. The unemployment among young had to be fight in providing an education that will more fit the expectation on the labour market. The social prestige of the mother had to be established again in those societies keeping the financial independence of the women.

Figure 4. Increasing fertility by education



Maybe some education measures to change the public opinions about the importance of the motherhood in the welfare system in France and Germany will reduce the pressure of the society on women trying to realise both career and family. Nevertheless a common goal of the French and the German family policy is to withdraw the women from the labour market which is in contradiction with female rights to work. That point could explain the reason why those policies have failed until now. Finally, for developing countries, it is important to know which factors could be used to maintain a fertility high enough to ensure the replacement of the population. Within some decades the developing countries will have to ensure the same issues about the fertility. It is why it is very important that developed countries could now be able to induce an increase of their fertility, thereby respecting the indigence aspiration of the main concerned people in this issue: women.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Marcel van den Broecke for helpful comments regarding the welfare system in Holland. Special thanks to Jakob Mauss for introducing me to influence diagrams, and to Kerstin Anger for technical support in preparing this paper.

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Types of Audience of Culture in Budapest

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In this study my intention was to learn what characteristic consumer groups of culture exist mainly in the field of televiewing, listening to the radio and reading, and how their habits changed during the last decade in the Hungarian capital. The data used for analysis were evolved from the HCSO's life-condition and time use surveys of 1986/1987 and 1999/2000.*

In the course of the time use survey we visited the respondents four times during four seasons to take down detailed time use journal about one selected day. (see methodological remark at the end)

Having studied the works of culture researchers of the end of the 20th century, I selected as a starting point a theoretical scheme that classifies certain cultural activities by type. Various kinds of economic background, media and different types of audience belong to the diverse types of culture.

According to a thesis of sociological research of culture which is widely accepted, a new competitive term emerged in view of the appearance and spreading of television in the 60's and 70's. It forced broadcasting, book and record publishing companies as well as local press to be specialised by regions, by social strata, by age groups, by sex and by life-condition in order to find and to bind together their own audience.

Researches of the 80's – chiefly in the US and West Germany – confirmed the weakening connection between cultural choices and social classes, and defined new style social milieux classified by life-condition. (e.g.: Schulze, G. 1992). Sociologists had to face the image of a society disintegrated into a thousand kinds of taste and lifestyle groups.

According to Diana Crane, who had made the sociological summarization of the culture of the American society, there are three cultural domains in which different types of organizations produce and disseminate culture: mass-culture, class-culture and other lifestyles. (Crane, D. 1992, pp.5.)

* In the followongs I indicate the earlier survey by the year 1986, and the later by 2000, the study refers to the 15-74 years old population.

Chart. Nr.1. Classification Scheme of Culture Organization*

Types of Culture Organization	Media	Main types of audience
<i>Central national industries</i>	<i>Television Film Leading national daily papers</i>	<i>Heterogeneous audience</i>
<i>Periferial industries</i>	<i>Book publishing Weeklys, magazines Local daily papers Record publishing</i>	<i>Lifestyle groups</i>
<i>Urban subcultures</i>	<i>Theatre Concert, opera Exhibition, museum Fairs Entertainments (amusements) Other concerts</i>	<i>Classes</i>

* Crane, D., 1992, p.6.

The **central field** of culture is ruled by the national and international media which draw a wide range of population into their sphere. Their audience is mass-audience consisting of individuals of different tastes and of different social backgrounds. The principal medium on this field is the television, but parts of it are Hollywood films and some national daily and weekly papers.

The leading cultural organizations in the **marginal field** of culture are the broadcasting networks, the record, magazine and book publishers, which do not appear on the international scene but their audience can be divided into separable sub-groups. These groups can be divided by different social and demographical characteristics: age, sex, minority group, social attitude, world view, residential environment. The variety of life-conditions is growing, newer and newer ones are formed. This process is called the "hyper segmentation" of the modern society. (Cathelat, B.1985)

The third field of culture is formed of **urban subcultures** possessing local roots. Here, the living characteristics of culture have an important role, authors are in close connection with one another and with their audiences and every so often new ideas are initiated here. Different cultural models survive partly in these urban subcultures. (Crane, D. 1992, p.9.)

In my analysis I operationalised some parts of this model and made tests on the data of the time-use survey. The essence of the **operationalisation** was the following:

A group displaying a particular activity can be considered as a heterogeneous type of audience if the measured values in individual categories of the surveyed independent variables are relatively high, and the individual categories do not deviate fundamentally and significantly from the average and from each other.

Cultural activities bound to life-condition groups are those where fundamental and significant deviations can be found according to sex, age group, family background (number of children living in a household). Also disparities by economic activities can be ranked among the independent variables, because the disparities between active and inactive people can be seized by the divergences of the life-quality rather than quantitative, traditional strata or class characteristics.

Finally, we can talk about a kind of class or traditional social segmentation if we find fundamental and significant deviations among the surveyed independent variables in the categories of educational level, residential environment or strata of occupation among the employees.

Applied method: I examined the power (Eta-values) of some main social variables in the explanation of time spending divergencies in the case of culture. The following step was to investigate the ratio of free time spent on culture at examined groups (standardization) and I formed the cultural types of audience in this way (clustering).

Chart Nr. 2.




Chart Nr. .3.




Chart Nr. 4a.

Explanation of divergencies of the cultural time use, A-index, Eta - values				
Independent variable	Tele-, videoviewing	Reading books	Other reading	Listening to radio, tape recorder etc.
1986/1987				
Sex	0,050	0,008	0,105	0,075
Age group	0,209	0,082	0,175	0,174
Educational level	0,100	0,080	0,094	0,069
Economic activity	0,202	0,083	0,182	0,157
Type of houshold	0,111	0,049	0,136	0,061
1999/2000				
Sex	0,010	0,050	0,096	0,044
Age group	0,299	0,100	0,199	0,152
Educational level	0,182	0,101	0,051	0,092
Economic activity	0,365	0,117	0,191	0,150
Type of houshold	0,211	0,083	0,118	0,097

Chart Nr. 4b.

Explanation of divergencies of the cultural time use, C-index, Eta - values				
Independent variable	Tele-, videoviewing	Reading books	Other reading	Listening to radio, tape recorder etc.
1986/1987				
Sex	0,057	0,046	0,060	0,155
Age group	0,206	0,102	0,111	0,075
Educational level	0,083	0,058	0,059	0,121
Economic activity	0,170	0,098	0,107	0,135
Type of household	0,086	0,089	0,033	0,115
1999/2000				
Sex	0,102	0,081	0,074	0,022
Age group	0,181	0,110	0,098	0,069
Educational level	0,096	0,172	0,074	0,067
Economic activity	0,176	0,123	0,158	0,115
Type of household	0,046	0,118	0,075	0,182

Some interesting results:

According to the data of chart Nr. 2. and 3., the best known cultural free-time activities are *television and video viewing*. On the basis of the sample, 85% of males and 86% of females were watching TV and video nearly 3 and a quarter hour per day. As compared to 1986, the ratio of TV and video viewers was growing by 10 percentpoints for both sexes; time spent in front of television by 32 minutes grew in the case of males and by 43 minutes in the case of females.

In 2000 the main distinctive factor was age, which divides the viewers into two big groups: people over and under 40. Stay-at-home pensioners with their limited financial means form a more intensive televiewer group as compared to the other categories of economic activity. Contrasted to this, dwellers of elite districts, being in better financial situation and also people with university education are moderate televiewers.

It follows from the above, that televiewing is a widespread freetime activity, and the heterogeneous community of viewers are parts of an acceptable hypothesis, with such a reservation that there are individual groups withdrawn from the magic circle of the television in a bigger extent, and the isolation of older people is emphasized by the higher rate of their televiewing time.

Newspaper reading is not such a widely characteristic activity; 19% of males and only 7,4 % of females read printed materials on the monitored day in 2000. As compared to 1986, the ratio of the readers drastically decreased both among males and females. It is an unambiguous fact that the daily information gathering is based on television, although it is also true that males “traditionally” get their information from the newspapers in higher proportion than females. Ratio of *book reading* on an average day of 2000 in the Budapest sub-sample is lower both for males (23%) and for females (21%) than television viewing. It may be presumed that book reading, irrespective of sex, is part of the occupation of an audience with definite demand and interest, who, irrespective of sex, are spending nearly the same time on book reading. This well established book reading public seems to remain permanent, the indices surveyed have changed only a little since 1986. The consequence of this is that the book reading public is a solid, well established circle, kept together by a common field of interest and by the activity of reading itself. It is also probable that a clearly defined circle of people invests time in the *listening of radio, tape recorder and record*; in the Budapest sub-sample 9,4% of males and 7,2% of females dedicated nearly the same time to this activity on an average day in 2000.

Explanation of deviations of the cultural time use

Values of the following chart (Eta-values) show how each social variable interprets separately the deviations of the cultural time use. (Taking the size of sample into consideration, values over 0,08 can be considered as significant.)

The following three conclusions can be drawn:

1st conclusion: The surveyed main social-economic variables – with the exception of sex – explain the dissemination of the daily time use spent on television and video viewing. These variables do not explain at all the dissemination of other cultural time-use or even if they explain, only to a small extent. In case of TV and video viewing, the explained ratio fluctuated between 20-30% in 2000, while it was between 10 and 20% in 1986.

2nd conclusion: The most substantial difference between the two examined periods is that deviations of time grew stronger along the surveyed variables – mainly in case of television and video viewing – and the explained ratio is higher in each case in 2000.

The influence of the independent variables can be put down to two components. On the one hand, how many people and who chose the given activity; on the other hand, the quantity of time spent on it by them. Examining the differences in the time uses along these social variables, it appeared that the growth of differences were not so much derived from the differences of time uses as from the fact that the camp of television viewers was growing but in different extents, along the certain social categories.

3rd conclusion: Among the independent variables, the impact of economic activity and age group surpasses the explanatory power of educational level. This supports the theoretical presupposition that the variables linked to lifestyle have a bigger share in the cultural time use than the educational level recognized as “traditional” (especially in Hungary as an explanatory variable).

Cultural clusters

I separated different cultural consumer clusters on the basis of the proportion of time people spent on TV-, and video viewing, newspaper, magazin and book reading from their free time. In other words: the basis of forming cultural clusters was the ratio of a given cultural activity within the free time.

Chart Nr. 5a.





Chart Nr. 5b.



In this way I have received four typical clusters in 2000. In the first cluster, the ratio of televiewing averaged one third (32,6%) within the free time, and in addition to it, more than two fifth was the share of book reading (43,4%). Nearly one tenth of the respondents got into this group. In the second cluster, besides the 45% of televiewing, about one third of the free time is occupied by reading of newspaper, magazine; it affects 9% of the dwellers of Budapest.

Only the extent of televiewing deviates in the further two consumer clusters. There is no considerable reading activity connected to the limited televiewing in the third cluster (one fifth of the free time 21,9%) less than one third (29,9%) of the respondents belong here. In the fourth cluster, about 80% of the free time is occupied by televiewing, and half the respondents (52,2%) belong here.

For the sake of easier comparison, I formed four clusters again in 1986, using the data base of that time, founded on the ratio of cultural activities within free time.

People who spent about two fifth of their free time on televiewing and half of it on book reading got into the first cluster, it was about one tenth of the sample. This cluster is distinguished from the one of 2000 in that although it represents nearly the same ratio, the share of televiewing is higher and the share of book reading is lower within the free time in the similar cluster. It can be stated that at least this group forms a narrow but solid segment of culture consumers.

38% of respondents got into the second cluster, these people spent one fifth of their free time on televiewing. The similar cluster in 2000 represented only 30% of the sample.

People who got into the third cluster spent only one tenth of their free time on televiewing and 65% on reading printed materials, but only 5% of the sample was represented by them, which is a narrower layer, that of book readers. There was no similar cluster in 2000 any more, only a group of people spending the bigger part of their free time (45%) on televiewing and the smaller part (31%) consuming printed materials.

The fourth cluster, similarly to 2000, consisted only the televiewers, but in 1986 only 74% was the average ratio of televiewing and video viewing as compared to the free time –about half the sample belonged here similarly – however, this was 82% in 2000.

Remarks: The reason why radio and music listening have got out from the cluster forming is that they are mainly subordinate activities. The ratio of listening to radio and music as main and subordinate activities within one day do not diverge significantly in the above cultural clusters.

Main divergences of people belonging to the four cultural clusters, formed in 1986, in compliance with some independent variables (Chart Nr. 6.)

- We cannot speak about substantial and significant divergences by sexes.
- There are two significant divergences by age groups: young people were above the average in the cluster of the moderate viewers and their share was lower than the average in case of heavy TV viewers. The situation was reversed in the case of middle-aged people.
- Divergences by highest education were similar to 2000. People with the lowest education belonged lesser to the book reading cluster, much the more to the televiewing in majority. There was a reversed situation in the case of people with the the highest education, moreover, they belonged in higher proportion to the press consumer cluster.
- By economic activity, I have found significant divergences also in 1986, but to a smaller extent than in 2000. The students belonged in higher proportion to the moderate viewers and in lower proportion to heavy TV viewers. The same tendency has shown up among the inactives. The opposite of it was true in case of employees – which was absolutely not the same in 2000. There was no divergence from the average among the pensioners.
- I have found only some, not too significant divergences by type of household.

Main divergences of people belonging to the four cultural clusters, formed in 2000, in compliance with some independent variables (Chart Nr. 7.)

- By sex, I have found two significant divergences. In the group of people who view TV and consume printed materials in medium ratio, the share of males was higher, while in the cluster of heavy TV viewers, the share of females was higher.
- It is also an important result that the share of people aged 15-24 is identical with the average in the book reading cluster. Nevertheless, their share is lower than the average in the press consumer cluster, and especially low in the cluster of heavy TV viewers. On the other hand, the share of young people is over the average in the cluster of the moderate televiewers. The share of people aged 25-39 is over the average in the cluster of the moderate televiewers, too. In compliance with this, the majority of middle-aged and old people belongs to the groups of moderate press consumer and televiewer group in majority.
- There are significant divergences among the clusters by highest education, but in a small extent only. People with the lowest education belong lesser to the book reading cluster, much the more to the televiewing in majority; while it is reversed at the people with highest education.
- By economic activity, I have found significant divergences, similar to the age-group differences, subject to the fact written about the young people, that half of the students belongs to the moderate televiewers, while in the other clusters, half of them, approaching the average, belong to people televiewing in majority. The proportion of employees belonging to the book reading cluster is lower than average. There are pensioners in higher proportion in the cluster of press consumer and heavy TV viewers, while unemployed and inactive people can be found rather among moderate televiewing people.
- I found less significant divergences in a smaller extent by type of household. Single persons have bigger share in the book reading cluster; households consisting adults and couples belonged in bigger proportion to the moderately televiewing and press consuming cluster. Households with two or more children were in bigger proportion in the cluster of moderate televiewers.

Final conclusion

I have partly managed to prove the model of culture outlined in the introductory chapter. Namely, it has been confirmed that we should not talk about “culture”, but “types of culture”. The cultural clusters also support the most important features of the theoretical presupposition: about the homogenous audiences of the television, and about the narrow reading layer.

Although the surveyed independent variables explain only feebly the deviations of cultural time use, the significant difference between categories have theoretical importance. Thus, the explanatory power of economic activity, age group and residential environment are considered as more important than that of the highest education (or the traditionally measured highest education).

Consequently, the deviations of the time use are less apprehensible by the objective social and economic variables. The individual cultural types of audience are presumably created and kept together by the cultural media. The field of problems can be better understood from the cultural field, than from traditional social groups. Moreover, personal decisions can have a substantial deal in the description of individual types of audience.

Chart Nr. 6.

Clusters of Culture by some explanatory variables, 1986/1987					
Independent variable	1	2	3	4	N=
	Moderate TV watcher			TV watcher in majority	
	and book reader		and press consumer		
Sex					
Male	9	39	5,5	46,6	3517
Female	10,9	36,6	4,5	48	3922
Age group					
15-24	13,1	54,6	-	28,7	1206
25-39	10,1	34,8	5	50,1	2265
40-59	9,4	30,2	6,6	53,8	2489
60-74	8,3	41	-	47,3	1480
Educational level					
Primary school and below	7,7	38,3	4,2	49,9	3082
Vocational school	8,3	37,1	3,7	50,9	676
Secondary school	11,8	37,3	4,7	46,2	2474
University	13,2	37,5	8,6	40,7	1156
Economic activity					
On child-care allowance and fee, housewife	11,1	32,2	-	49,7	314
Student	13,9	52,6	3,2	30,3	555
Employee	9,6	35,6	5,5	49,4	4652
Pensioner	9,6	38,7	4	47,6	1866
Unemployed, other inactive	-	-	-	-	54
Some types of household					
Single	10,1	46,9	-	37,9	535
Adult household	9,2	36,5	5,1	49,2	1925
Couple+1 child	10,2	33,2	-	51,6	746
Couple+2 and more children	9,8	36,1	4,4	49,7	1808
One parent with children	-	40,1	-	46,7	242
Mean	10	37,7	5	47,3	7439
	... unadjusted Standardized Value is more than +2, or less than -2.				

Chart Nr. 7.

Clusters of Culture by some explanatory variables, 1999/2000					
Independent variable	1	2	3	4	N=
	TV watcher in medium book reader	press consumer	Moderate TV watcher	TV watching in majority	
Sex					
Male	8,9	10,8	32,2	48,1	3374
Female	9,2	7,1	28,0	55,6	3993
Age group					
15-24	8,9	4,5	48,4	38,2	1434
25-39	8,0	6,3	34,5	51,1	1866
40-59	8,6	10,0	21,7	59,6	2718
60-74	11,8	14,2	20,5	53,5	1349
Educational level					
Primary school and below	6,7	7,0	29,5	56,8	1425
Vocational school	6,3	8,8	24,4	60,4	1215
Secondary school	7,7	8,6	31,7	52,0	3076
University	15,8	10,7	31,0	42,5	1650
Economic activity					
On child-care allowance and fee, housewife	-	-	26,5	60,0	230
Student	11,1	3,7	50,2	35,1	923
Employee	8,3	8,3	29,2	54,2	4142
Pensioner	10,2	12,9	20,4	56,5	1793
Unemployed, other inactive	-	-	38,4	45,2	279
Some types of household					
Single	11,3	8,1	28,0	52,6	1173
Adult household	7,8	11,6	26,2	54,5	2102
Couple+1 child	9,2	8,0	31,2	51,6	1011
Couple+2 and more children	9,5	7,4	34,7	48,4	1210
One parent with children	-	-	34,7	52,3	562
Mean	9,1	8,8	29,9	52,2	7367
	... unadjusted Standardized Value is more than +2, or less than -2.				

Chart Nr. 8.

Hungarian Time Use Survey 1999/2000¹	
Survey Design	
Population	15-84 years old
Sample design	Individuals at domestic addresses. The sample was selected from the Microcensus 1996. The unit of the sample was a flat. If in the flat there was more than one household the largest household was selected. The households in which there were only people 85 or older were excluded. In every selected household one household member was randomly chosen.
Sample size (Effective)	10.105 individuals
Budapest	2.130 individuals
Size of non-response²	Individuals 8,3% Diaries 1,9%
Diary days	The day before the designated day of the interview was selected as diary day.
Diaries	43.166
From which: Budapest	8.667
Interview rules	Face-to-face interview
Fieldwork periods	I. period 01/09/1999-02/12/1999 II. period 03/12/1999-04/03/2000 III. period 05/03/2000-05/06/2000 IV. period 06/06/2000-06/09/2000
Representative	The sample is representative according to age (15-84 years old), season and the days of the week .

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¹ Extract of the paper prepared by Béla Falussy, Tamás Sághi, and Endre Sik for the Time Use Survey Task Force meeting, 14-15 June 2001, EUROSTAT, Luxemburg.

² At the first stage of the fieldwork the original sample (Microcensus 1996, being already three years old) contained a rather large number of outdated addresses and therefore had to be corrected. The non-response rate refers to this refreshed sample.

Foreign nationals and immigrant policy in Finland

Markku LANKINEN, Helsinki Urban Facts, Finland

For several reasons and for decades, Finland remained relatively unaffected by the international migration flows that the rest of Europe experienced from the 1950-60s on. In continental and southern Europe, where industrialisation had reached far, labour was needed for production and, later, services – particularly for low-wage tasks. The countries south of the Alps and the Pyrenees, received plenty of willing immigrants, and the proportions of foreign nationals started growing. Between 1945 and 1975, when many Finns mostly from rural depopulation areas moved to Sweden for work attracted by better opportunities for work and income, Finland had more emigration than immigration.


In the 1970s, the Finnish economy was gradually modernised, and GNP started growing faster. Emigration surpluses turned into re-migration, but no flow of foreign immigrants was yet seen. The granting of work permits to foreigners was strictly limited – and you had to have one to be granted a visa to Finland. This led to a situation where foreign nationals in Helsinki were mainly foreign experts. In the rest of Finland, foreign nationals were even less common.

Adjacent areas usually have the liveliest exchange of communication and population. A special feature of Finland is its geopolitical position. The border against the Soviet Union was totally closed. Many Finns still remember the two Estonians who paddled across the Gulf of Finland in a rubber dinghy. For this reason, foreign nationals in Helsinki were almost exclusively from the West, with a few rare instances of people with darker skin. Figure 1 illustrates this circumstance: up until 1990, the number of foreign nationals in Helsinki stayed small and consisted mainly of Europeans.

The year 1991 marked a shift in this development. the Finnish Government invited the Inkeri – ethnic Finns from the Ingermanland region around St. Petersburg that had been persecuted and scattered all over the union by the Stalin regime – to come to Finland, and gave them the status of returning emigrants. This was the first impulse of immigration. In Somalia, a deep crisis heralded the fall of Siad Barre's dictatorship, and a civil war followed it. One of the escape routes went from Mogadishu to Moscow and – after the disintegration of the Soviet Union – by train to Helsinki. This marked the beginning of a trend in the 1990s which by January 2002 had given Helsinki a six per cent element of people with a foreign mother tongue.

Figure 1:

Foreign nationals in Helsinki 1985-2001




This falls little short of the proportion of Swedish-speaking Finns, who have decreased to 6.4 per cent – compared with 7.4 per cent ten years earlier. Figure 1 shows us that today one-third of foreign nationals in Helsinki are from the traditional West, another third from the former Soviet Union and a third from Africa or Asia. Among immigrants, we may distinguish between refugees, re-immigrants and others. Between 1990 and 1998, 14,600 people moved to Finland as refugees. Among these, 22 per cent have been placed in Helsinki, which corresponds to the overall proportion of people.

Our analysis by region shows that immigrants have accumulated in Helsinki. Yet, a trend towards more even regional distribution can be discerned. This is shown particularly by the semi-logarithm presentation, which reveals the fluctuations and differences in the rate of change. Ever since 1997, the proportion of people with a foreign mother tongue has grown faster in Helsinki’s neighbours Espoo and Vantaa than in Helsinki.

Figure 2:

The proportion of people with foreign mother tongue in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area



So, Finland and Helsinki changed considerably in the 1990s. This happened to coincide with an economical depression of a kind never seen before in Finland. We might very well imagine that immigrants – often living on social benefits and speaking Finnish poorly, and many of whom were placed in districts suffering from mass unemployment – could have caused serious conflicts and expulsion reactions. We have seen some evidence of such phenomena occurring, but the bulk of it must either have escaped the attention of media – or not existed at all. However, the fact that the tenant committee of one of the city's rented blocks of flats suggested to the City Council that the proportion of foreign immigrants in a block of flats should never exceed 15 per cent can be interpreted as a symptom.

From the point of view of the cultural confrontation theory we might think that xenophobia would be a penetrating feature when people of different cultures and races first meet. The phenomenon is very common and manifests itself in the use of stereotypes as tools for thinking and – in extreme cases – neo-fascist movements such as the skinheads. Recent elections in France, Denmark and Holland have shown how fast suspicion against immigrants may articulate itself into a political movement with – subsequently – widespread support.

Why has there to date been so little signs of such violent xenophobia in Finland and Helsinki? We have not been spared from them altogether, but it looks as though even the skinhead movement has lost momentum with a shift of generation. There have been a few clashes between Finns and Somalis. Yet, the makings of larger conflicts are present in Finland just as anywhere else.


I would like to point out one possible explanation to the relatively rarity of xenophobia in Finland, namely the official bilingual status of the Finnish nation, expressed in the constitution and implemented locally depending on whether a certain percentage of either language lives in a municipality. The Swedish-speaking population makes up a decreasing proportion of our population, but it has had an important role in the shaping of the mental environment of the Finnish-speaking majority. The daily presence of another culture in a bilingual community teaches people to tolerate people who are different. Bilingualism can be seen in the street signs – a feature that is uncommon elsewhere in Europe even where cultural minorities make up greater proportions than the Swedish-speaking minority does in Finland. It is such an integrated element of everyday reality that people do not even notice it. Such a community probably has a better readiness to accept new elements than a culturally homogeneous environment is. As a comparison we might mention a uniquely Finnish-speaking city in eastern Finland, whose reputation has been marred by disturbances, arson and violence against a small group of coloured immigrants.

Definitions of foreigners

Immigrants are defined in several ways in Finland. The widest definition talks about *people with a foreign background*, including all those born abroad plus those with either parent born abroad. The second largest definition are *people speaking a foreign language*, i.e. anyone who does not have Finnish or Swedish as their mother tongue. The narrowest definition are *foreign nationals*, the number of whom is continuously reduced by people becoming naturalised after a certain period of time and certain procedures of application. The difference between the categories people with a foreign background and foreign nationals is shown by Figure 3. Naturalisation has mainly concerned people immigrating from Sweden or the former Soviet Union, but with immigrants from many other countries, too, the effect of naturalisation is obvious.

Figure 3:


Foreign nationality and foreign background



The location of immigrants in the city structure varies between European cities. A common feature is that old worker-dominated districts near the city centre have turned into reception areas for the immigrants. In Scandinavia, this has been seen in, for example, Copenhagen and Oslo, and the tendency is obvious in many German cities (Hynynen 2002).

Figure 4:

Proportion of immigrants in housing areas in Hamburg and Helsinki, ten highest and ten lowest




(The Hamburg data was collected from the well-organised web-pages of the City of Hamburg).

Another tendency can be seen in areas where local authorities have applied needs-assessed housing policy. Suburbs built in the 1960s – often in Le Corbusier’s spirit – have become the home of immigrant communities. Sweden, England and France have seen spectacular examples of such development. With the original population moving away and making way for new immigrant groups, the foreign background population has, in certain cases, accounted for 70-90 per cent of the population in suburbs in these countries. The phenomenon is at least partly due to the needs-assessment system, which gives low-income earners such as immigrants priority to council housing.

In Finland, too, public housing policy has had this kind of basis, at least partly. The role of municipal housing, however, is less important than in Sweden: in Helsinki, council housing, i.e. municipal rented housing, accounts for 16 per cent of the housing stock. Thus we might imagine that a housing allocation policy which favours the deprived is a road towards increasing social differentiation. Yet, a simple statistical analysis suggests something else.

Figure 5:

deviation in the local distribution of people with a foreign mother tongue
(proportions weighted by the population figure)




We may interpret that both the standard deviation of the local proportions of people with a foreign mother tongue have grown. Yet, we cannot directly deduce whether the trend goes towards local concentration or dispersion. For this purpose, the concept of variation coefficient has been taken to use, Its value is the standard deviation divided by the average of the distribution multiplied by one hundred. Increasing values indicate increasing differentiation. Figure 5 shows that the variation has fluctuated within a rather narrow range of readings. Thus, we may deduce that the local distribution of immigrants in Helsinki shows no tendency of local differentiation. The population-weighting technique was used to avoid over-significance for areas with a small population.

Is the variation we have seen small or great? We may attempt an answer by comparing our findings with the local distribution of Swedish-speaking Finns in the city and how this distribution has changed over time.

Figure 6:

Deviation in the local distribution of Swedish-speaking Finns in Helsinki during the period 1972 to 2002




The local distribution over time of the Swedish-speaking population differs considerably from the trend among immigrants. The number of Swedish-speaking Finns in Helsinki in 2002 amounts only to 61 per cent of their number in 1972. From the early 1990s on, the decreasing trend proceeded with a slightly falling angle coefficient. The decrease stopped at the 36,000 inhabitant level, but with the growth of the rest of the population, the proportion of Swedish-speaking inhabitants has decreased.

The standard deviation, too, has decreased, but at a relatively slower pace. Thus, the value of the variation coefficient has been growing all the time. This is a sign of an accelerating local differentiation among the Swedish-speaking population – coinciding with a decline in their number.

What explains the trend in the local distribution of immigrants in Helsinki? One possible reason may be the location of municipal rented housing. Figure 7 shows that it is distributed unevenly over the city. Among the roughly one hundred districts in the city, 71 contain dwellings that are allocated on social grounds. The rest primarily lie in the oldest parts of Inner Helsinki or are small areas with mostly detached houses.

Figure 7:

The proportion of council housing and people with a foreign mother tongue in Helsinki's districts in 2001




This comparison shows a certain correlation between the occurrence of public rented dwellings and immigrants in districts. But the variation is great and, in addition, there are sub-districts which have a greater proportion of immigrants than the average although there are no city dwellings at all in them. Kauppinen (2001) has studied the local distribution of immigrants of various nationality and its correlation with public housing.

It appeared that various immigrant groups are in different positions. Those coming from western countries often find a home in the socio-economically most successful areas, whereas immigrants from Africa and the former Soviet Union are more dependent on dwellings allocated after needs-assessment.

A silent ambition of the City of Helsinki is to have immigrants relatively evenly distributed over the city and to avoid the birth of Chinatowns or similar communities, because this would trigger a development of social and ethnic segregation. How successful has the city been? If we look at the proportions of children with a foreign mother tongue, this goal does not seem to have been achieved. But if we look at the numbers of children, too, we notice that the concentration of relative proportions leads us astray. The mode of the distribution is found exactly in the class where the overall proportion of children with a foreign mother tongue is at the average for the whole city. Exceptions to the rule are such new areas where the proportion of academic exchange researchers is exceptionally great, and which therefore cannot be regarded as typical.

Figure 8:

Numbers and relative proportions of children with a foreign mother tongue in 2000




Thus, the presentation above shows Helsinki's ambition to prevent the birth of large-scale segregation in the city in a situation where the proportion of immigrants in the population grows. But regardless of such awareness, the risk of such a development is great. Unemployment has been and still is a factor which strongly contributes to social exclusion.

Yet, it is comforting to know that unemployment has shown signs of decline and that the situation of the whole population – not only the immigrants – has improved considerably. What does grow, however, is the proportion of immigrants among the jobless, which is an obvious risk factor. It has risen from 8 % in 1994 to 13 % in 2001.

Figure 9:

Unemployment among immigrants in Helsinki



We also know that immigrants of different nationalities have found work at different paces. Language skills are a known key factor: unless you know the language you will have great difficulties to show your skills and gain a position on the labour market. The worst numbers for unemployment rate coincide with a nationality coming from South-West Asia of Africa. Finland tries to invest in language tuition for immigrants to integrate them into society. In kindergartens and schools this means that immigrant children learn either Finnish or Swedish plus their own mother tongue. This is supposed to consolidate their identity and promote integration better than the opposite would: to encourage children to forget their own culture. Helsinki adopted this philosophy four years ago as a basis for its own immigrants. Finland has not had the kind of political movements that have wanted to stop this. One reason may be that half of the new immigrants have come from the former Soviet Union under the status of re-immigrants in a situation where the Stalin-generated nationality policy did not allow them to pass on the Finnish language and identity to their children. The aim was to help these people find what they had lost.

It stays to be seen, if this effort for a policy will achieve success. The cultural barriers are high, the crash of traditions connected to religions other than the prevalent Lutheran Christianity here in North do not promise easy solutions. Yet, it has been admitted more and more, that Finland has to learn herself to understand and accept foreign habits.

Congress of Polish Culture took place in Warsaw from 7th through 10th Dec. 2000. Its aim was to acquaint decision-makers with knowledge and opinions of experts in the respect of the current condition of Polish culture. The participants discussed in specialist groups, e.g. focusing on protection of national heritage, creative potential of Poles, contemporary elite groups and authorities, new media and new contents.

Many participants debating the shape of a culture searching its own identity, changing yet retaining its own principal values stressed the need of rejecting narrow stereotypes without leaving the ground of historical and cultural experience.

334 candidates were proposed in 2000, of which 18 were nominated, and 6 awarded by a team of twelve judges including top-ranking Polish artists, e.g. Jan Englert, Krzysztof Zanussi, Marek Król and Jaroslaw Kilian.

[czy Marek Król to jakiego wybitny artysta czy naczelny Wprost]

- “Sponsor” (sponsor) — Powszechny Bank Kredytowy S.A. for a comprehensive programme of support for cultural initiatives,
- “Promotor” (promoter) — Art Marketing Syndicate S.A. for creating a series of non-commercial, artistic, and social, posters which were displayed on 400 hoardings in 19 cities,
- “Patron” — TV channel Polonia for patronage over the Musical Festival in Lancut,
- “Fundator” (fund provider) — Servisco company for funding an illumination of the Opera House in Warsaw,
- “Kolekcjoner” (collector) — Bank Handlowy for establishing, development, and enriching of a numismatic collection at the Royal castle in Warsaw,
- “Donator” (donor) — Urszula and Sławomir Jakubowski for donations for Boguslawski Theatre i Calisia, and Theatre Meetings in Calisia.

The laureates received statuettes of Golden Laurel by Janusz Pastwa, Dean of the Sculpture Faculty of the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw. The prizes were handed out by the Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek.

During the mentioned Congress of Polish Culture in Warsaw an obvious fact was stressed that culture is a basis of national consciousness.

Aspects of Cultural Life: Example of Warsaw in the 1990's

Bogusława Bulska, Main Statistical Office Warsaw, Poland

Culture is an important domain of social activities of Poles. I shall present only few aspects of development in this field, which was once termed by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski “a medicine of sensitivity”.

The artistic establishment have demanded for a long time an intensification of cultural education, as well as reshaping of cultural institutions and changing their principles. Material problems of artists and their institutions (theatres, libraries, philharmonics) are also in medial discussions. Imperfect legislation is criticised, as well as vacuous TV programmes and threats to Polish language emphasised.

Increased government investments in culture would at best be possible in some distant future. Cultural institutions still more often resort to private sponsors. Private patronage is being increasingly appreciated. A reasonable scheme encouraging potential sponsors surely would help. Gallery of Contemporary Art "Zachęta" in Warsaw, now a hundred years old, is a notable example.

The first step toward official appreciation of maecenases of arts was a competition "**Mecenas Kultury 2000**" (Maecenas of Culture 2000) organised by the Ministry of Arts and National Heritage in 6 categories: "Promoter", "Sponsor", "Donator", "Collector", "Founder", "Medial Patron". The minister declared that this initiative does not mean that the government would quit financing of artistic projects but only that they encourage and appreciate patrons of arts.

In a TV interview Andrzej Wajda and Wislawa Szymborska stated that Polish culture is still a matter of an elite and artists still act in a romantic manner. According to them, over the last decade democracy failed to change that. Film director Krzysztof Zanussi stated: "Once we dreamed about freedom and everything seemed simple. Now we are free and nothing is simple. We live during a barren period of a barren culture". That was surely an overstatement, and it is worth pointing to a counterexample: the Salon of Polish Poster Art in Wilanów which is the largest regular presentation of this kind in Poland, mirroring the current state of the Polish poster art, and newest trends in the field. The 10th edition in November 2001 was of a high artistic level. "Zycie Warszawy" daily commented: "I something should be wished for the Polish poster art and artist, it would be wise and generous customers. The artists have enough creative potential and interesting ideas".

"**Zachęta**" gallery is renowned among Varsovians, however sometimes works shown there, especially by foreign artists, prove to be quite unwelcome. Two incidents happened at the gallery in 2001. During the exhibition of "The Nazis" by Piotr Uklański (a series of stills depicting actors in German uniforms) film actor Daniel Olbrychski actively protested. A MP attempted to vandalise a composition "Holy Father" by Mauricio Cattalani (the Pope struck by a meteorite).

From 1st through 27th May 2001 the gallery presented a retrospective of World Press Photo ranging over 40 years of military conflicts, ecological dangers, human dramas, scientific, cultural, and sports achievements. Displayed were cruel photos from Africa, Chechnya, Eastern Timor, and Balkans, as well as brighter ones taken during the demolition of the Berlin Wall or picturing technological achievements.

The Centre of Contemporary Art located in the Ujazdowski Castle houses a rich collection of graphical art, painting, photography, new media (documents of installations, laser and computer art), and films about art. In October 2001 a festival of art films was organised and another one of multimedia theatre, including a presentation of modern Japanese theatre and dance. A month the Centre was the venue of a literary event “Warszawa Pisarzy”, including meetings with authors and critics, musical performances, and screenings of films from the series “Pokolenie 2000” (Generation 2000).

The **Warsaw Philharmonic** celebrated its first century on 5th November 2001. A hundred years earlier Ignacy Jan Paderewski performed his e-moll piano concerto there. The same piece was again played during the recent celebrations by Piotr Paleczny. The Philharmonic have had a rich record of great guests, both composers (Grieg, Rachmaninov, Strawinski, Lutoslawski), and excellent performers.

Changes in culture management resulted mostly in decentralisation, making institutions more independent, and in growth of private sector in this respect. In 1999 most of cultural institutions came under management of local self-governments. Thus the latter became the largest provider of funds for culture.

The share of public expenditures on culture and arts was 0.41 % GNP both in 1999 and 2000. The sum of budget expenditures (including donations and subventions for local self-governments) rose by 2.2 % from 1999 to 2000. However, compared to the volume of state budget it was slightly less (0.42 % instead of 0.42 %). It was 16.35 Zloty (ca. •3.98) per 1 citizen.

In Warsaw, outlays of boroughs (gminas) on culture and arts per 1 inhabitant were 285.5 Zloty (ca. •69.63) in 1999, or 2.3% of respective budgets (2.4 % in 1996).

Reading is still the most popular participatory activity in culture. However, over the last decade Warsaw lost some of its libraries. It was 392 of them in 1990, and only 180 in 2000, thus number of inhabitants per one establishment rose from 4224 to 5368, as did volume stock per 1 inhabitant (from 2747 to 2979) and number of borrowings (from 3822 to 4112). Libraries have enriched their stock, now offering magnetic cassettes, video cassettes and CDs. They try to attract young readers by exhibitions, meetings with authors, presentations or screenings.

The 1990s saw a substantial increase of number of titles of books, brochures and other publications (from 4964 in 1990 to 8098 in 1999), except musical notes and documents of social life. Number of school textbooks, literary books increased twofold, there were also 50% more scholarly and popular titles and almost as twice as much university textbooks. Circulations of these titles, however, systematically decreased (by almost 50% from 1990 to 2000). The only exception were university textbooks (their number of printed copies increased by 58%).

Warsaw has 141 scientific publishers. Their offer has been presented for 8 years during an annual academic book fair in the Warsaw Technical University. It is noteworthy that publishers from Warsaw and Cracow issue 52% of all non-periodicals in Poland. In this respect, even greater is the market share of printers based in Warsaw (they supply 61.4% of all copies).

Prices of books rise faster than it is dictated by inflation. Over the last year the increase in the average book price was twice the inflation rate. It is most evident from the example of belles-lettres. In this case the average retail price of one softcover volume was 26.60 Zloty (ca. • 6,48), now it is 28–32 Zloty (ca. • 6,82–7,80). Hardbound copies are of course more expensive: 38–50 Zloty (• 9.26–12.19).

In this case the prices already reached the Western level, despite low publishing costs, not exceeding 20–25% of retail prices. It is due to inefficient distribution system in Poland. Another cause is overproduction but happily unsold books are being withdrawn to hypermarkets and discount stores (for 5–10 Zloty or • 1.22–2.43).

The last decade saw shrinking of newspapers' market in Warsaw. In 1999 Warsaw had 14 of them, 8 less than in 1990, however as much as in 1995. Average daily circulation of these newspapers totalled 2 million (354,000 less than in 1990). However, the global circulation rose by 17% (from 494.7 million to 578.6 million copies). It was 358.2 copies per 1000 inhabitants in 1999 compared to 298.8 in 1990.

A growth in the market of periodicals is evident both in their number and in circulation. While in 1990 the number periodicals was 1401, in 1999 it was 1968, i.e. 56% (567) more. Over the same period the global circulation rose 2.3 times, from 496.6 million of copies to 1136.9 million. The global circulation of newspapers and periodicals per 1000 inhabitants rose from 598.7 copies in 1990 to 928.5 copies in 2000, i.e. by 75%. In 2000 periodicals from Warsaw, Cracow, and Katowice made up 45.5% of all press titles in Poland, the respective share of the global circulation was even higher—71.5%.

Numbers of both radio and TV subscribers were shrinking: from 381 to 314 radio subscribers per 1000 inhabitants, and from 344 to 304 TV subscribers per 1000 inhabitants (1990–1999).

According to GUS, the number of cinemas in Warsaw remained unchanged during the 1990's (35 establishments both in 1990 and in 2000). Number of cinema admissions per 1000 inhabitants rose from 1751.8 (1991) to 2941 (2000). The capital also gained 3 new theatres (there were 20 of them on 1990, 23 in 2000). Theatre attendances (1010.5 thous. in 1990) reached 1060.2 thous. in 2000. The annual number of stage performances rose from 3937 to 5623 in 2000.

Warsaw is the venue of most premiere screenings or press previews of Polish films, there are also film festivals.

In 2000 two opera houses organised 267 concerts for a total audience of 238.8 thousand (440 concerts and 319.4 thousand of audience in 1990). In the meantime two operetta houses in Warsaw increased the number of performances, to 430 for 232.2 thous. of people (1995), compared to 232 for 164.3 thousand in 1990. However, at that time the city had only one operetta. Yet in 2000 there were only 350 performances for 182.1 thous.

The audience of the Warsaw Philharmonic had remained rather stable over the 1990's, as did the number of concerts: 157 in 1990 versus 151 in 1999, a considerable reduction occurred only in 1995 (117), and a sharp reduction in 2000 (only 77 concerts). The audience totalled 123.4 thous. in 1990 compared to 107.0 thous. w 1999, and 57.1 in 2000. An addition to the Philharmonic's activities are concerts by The Symphonic and Chamber Orchestra which can seat 80 people. In 1999 289 concerts were attended by 23.6 thousand people (249 concerts and an audience of 20.4 thousand in 1998). In the year 2000 there were only 144 concerts for 31.5 thousand people.

Museums play a considerable role in acquainting the public with history and tradition. Their number increased from 46 in 1990 to 50 in 2000, however, attendance decreased from 2,783,000 to 2,055,000. In 1999 Warsaw museums held 316 own and guest exhibitions. Establishments housing artistic and historical collections are most popular. Apart from exhibitions museums organise lectures, museum classes, film screenings, they also publish catalogues, leaflets and information booklets. The latter totalled 3,600 titles in 3.4 million copies.

Botanical and zoological gardens are also an attraction. Attendance at two botanical gardens (Warsaw and Powsin) reached 223,000 in 1999. The zoological garden was visited by 530,000.

There are also other exhibitions, at 23 galleries mostly housing works of modern arts. 12 of them are government-run (incl. 6 self-government establishments), 11 are privately run, of which 6 by natural persons.

Among Polish cities which are also sub-regions, Warsaw has the highest per capita indices of library stock, library readership, capacity and audience of cinemas. Cracow has the largest number of tourist accommodations, however, Warsaw has the largest total capacity of tourist lodgings.

Among Central European capitals (including Bratislava, Berlin, Prague, and Vienna), Warsaw can be compared with Budapest and Prague in the respect of number of theatres. Budapest has 21 of them, and Prague 21. Vienna has only 12, and Berlin as much as 52. The total capacity of theatre establishments is similar to that in Prague, and is slightly less than in Vienna. We do not have data for Berlin.

Berlin has almost three times as much museums as Warsaw does (141 compared to 50). Budapest has 93, and Vienna 90. Prague and Bratislava have much less of these establishments (22 and 6).

The number of readers in libraries in Berlin (24,378 thousand) in Berlin is incomparable. Warsaw has 288 thousand, which is not bad on the background of other cities: Prague (179), Budapest (143), Vienna (104), Bratislava (56).

Museums in Vienna and in Berlin attract the largest crowds (7 million each). The number of museum visitors in Warsaw (2331 thous.) is comparable to those in Budapest (2589) and Prague (2007), greatly exceeding that in Bratislava (315 thous.).

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Tablews:

Table 1:

libraries^a, library stock, borrowings					
year	no. of establishments	no. of population per 1 establishment	library stock (vols.)		per 1,000 of population
			per 1,000 of population	per 1 reader	
as of 31st Dec.					
1990	392	4224	2747	17,9	3822
1995	310	5275	2828	17,4	4843
1996	320	5089	2848	17,2	4350
1997	286	5681	2851	16,5	4346
1998	314	5154	2920	16,4	4310
1999	285	5668	2947	16,2	4197
2000	180	5368	2979	15,8	4112

^a incl. branches and library outlets.
source: *Rocznik Statystyczny Warszawy 2000*, Statistical Office in Warsaw, Warsaw 2001, p. 236, GUS tables, 2000.

Table 2:

number and circulation of published books' and periodicals' titles				
type of publication	1990	1995	1999	2000
titles				
total	4.964	5.601	8.098	.
scholarly publications	1.515	1.292	2.137	2.303
academic textbooks	310	364	555	590
general readership	1.817	1.868	2.590	2.487
school textbooks	419	648	848	842
belles-lettres	803	1.309	1.730	1.854
of which for children and youth	207	243	472	379
musical notes	57	40	1	.
maps	34	72	237	.
documents of social life	9	8	-	.
circulation, 000's				
total	127.317	95.623	58.749	63.077
scholarly publications	4.779	2.122	2.928	2.852
academic textbooks	913	1.013	1.036	878
general readership	43.795	14.617	15.205	13.513
school textbooks	38.614	41.044	21.256	23.997
belles-lettres	37.226	34.881	16.373	18.005
of which for children and youth	10.258	2.933	3.063	3.686
musical notes	50	34	0,5	.
maps	1.930	1.884	1.950	.
documents of social life	10	28	-	.

Source: Bogusława M. Bułska *Warszawa u schyłku XIX i na progu XXI wieku w dokumentacji statystycznej*, Warsaw 2000, p. 315, GUS tables (1999, and 2000).

Table 3:

newspapers & other periodicals published in Warsaw				
	1990	1995	1999	2000
titles^a	1.423	1.613	1.982	2.006
total circulation of single issues, 000's of copies	31.831	51.788	47.967	.
global circulation, 000's of copies	991.268	1.876.341	1.715.487	1.734.477
per 1000 inhabitants	598,7	1.145,3	1.062,0	928,5
newspapers' titles^a	22	14	14	.
total circulation of single issues, 000's of copies	2.357	2.122	2.003	.
global circulation, 000's of copies	494.714	621.787	578.572	.
per 1000 inhabitants	298,8	379,5	358,2	.
periodicals' titles^a	1.401	1.599	1.968	.
total circulation of single issues, 000's of copies	29.474	49.666	45.964	.
global circulation, 000's of copies	496.554	1.254.554	1.136.915	.
per 1000 inhabitants	299,9	765,8	703,8	.

^a Excl. multiple versions of the same newspaper.
Source: *Rocznik Statystyczny Warszawy 2000*, Statistical Office in Warsaw, Warsaw 2001, p. 239, GUS tables.

Table 4:

Musical institutions				
	1990	1995	1999	2000
operas ^a	2	2	2	2
capacity ^{ab}	2.459	2.421	2.434	2.402
audience, 000's	319,4	281,5	280,5	238,8
concerts ^b	440	291	313	267
Warsaw operette ^a	1	2	2	2
capacity ^{ab}	822	1.405	1.376	1.340
audience, 000's	164,3	232,2	155,5	182,1
performance ^b	232	430	338	350
Warsaw Philharmonic ^a	1	1	1	1
capacity ^{ab}	1.505	1.505	1.505	1.505
audience, 000's	123,4	82,7	107,0	57,1
concerts ^b	157	117	151	77
The Warsaw Symphony and Chamber Orchestra ^a	1	1	1	1
capacity ^{ab}	.	80	80	80
audience, 000's	.	20,4 ^c	23,6	31,5
concerts ^b	.	249 ^c	289	144

^a As of 31st Dec. ^b W stalej sali. ^c 1998 r.
Source: *Rocznik Statystyczny Warszawy 2000*, Statistical Office in Warsaw, Warsaw 2001, p. 242, GUS tables (2000).

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